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Abstract
Obesity and overweight are linked to diseases that cost society a signiﬁ  cant amount 
of resources. While behavior modiﬁ  cation can reduce the problem, instigating such 
lifestyle changes is an uneasy task. One potential way to reduce the problem is through 
the use of ﬁ  nancial incentives. In this survey, we review the available evidence with a 
signiﬁ  cant emphasis on studies that yield credible estimates of the eﬀ  ect of ﬁ  nancial 
incentives on weight loss. We ﬁ  nd that the scientiﬁ  c literature on the subject has 
not yet satisfactorily settled whether such a mechanism is eﬀ  ective at eliciting the 
desired behavioral and health outcomes. We therefore advocate a rigorous large-scale 
randomized experiment to provide reliable estimates of the eﬀ  ect.
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That obesity has reached epidemic proportions in the United States is well known. 
Testifying before the House of Representatives in 2003, the US Surgeon General warned 
that America was facing an obesity crisis. At that time, almost two thirds of Americans 
were either overweight or obese. More importantly, one in eight deaths in America was 
caused by a disease directly related to being overweight or obese.
2 
  While figures from the US are drastic, what is extremely worrisome is the global 
nature of the problem. Table 1 presents comparable data on obesity
3 from the OECD. 
Only Japan and Korea have single-digit percentages while most other countries have 
populations over a fifth of which is obese. Although categorized as one of the “diseases 
of affluence”, obesity is not exclusive to rich countries. As documented elsewhere (e.g., 
Prentice 2006), the obesity rate is exploding in developing countries as well, such that it 
is now more often referred to as the obesity pandemic, reflecting the extent of its 
geographic prevalence. The result is that international organizations and national 
policymakers have acknowledged that obesity and overweight are public health 
problems which require intervention. 
  One possible policy handle is the use of financial incentives to either reward or 
penalize individuals based on whether they have achieved a contractual target weight. 
The logic of using monetary instruments to encourage individuals to lose weight is 
straightforward. Unhealthy eating habits may increase a person’s utility in the short run 
but the subsequent decrease in utility (e.g., due to health problems associated with 
obesity) fails to be taken into account (Cutler et al. 2003). Most people are aware of this 
tradeoff and, in principle, would prefer long-run satisfaction over short-term bliss. For 
instance, in the US, 70 percent of obese women and around 63 percent of obese men try 
to lose weight (Bish et al.  2005). However, because some benefits of healthy living 
materialize in the distant future while food consumption yields instantaneous 
gratification, most people often fail to reach desired weight goals (Sassi 2010). 
                                                           
2 “The obesity crisis in America”, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Education Reform, 
Committee on Education and the Workforce, United States House of Representatives by 
Richard H. Carmona, Surgeon General. http://goo.gl/KHWvY. Accessed on 17 May 2011. 
3 The World Health Organization (WHO) defines obesity as having a BMI greater than or equal 
to 30 kg/m2. A person with a BMI greater than or equal to 25 kg/m
2 is considered overweight. 
(WHO 2011) 5 
 
TABLE 1  
Percentage share of adult population with a BMI greater 
than 30 kg/m
2 
Country  Share in percent 
Year of latest 
available figure 
Australia  24.8  2007 
Canada  24.2  2008 
Chile  24.5  2003 
Czech Republic  17.0  2005 
Germany  14.7  2009 
Ireland  23.0  2007 
Japan  3.4  2008 
Korea  3.8  2008 
Luxembourg  20.0  2007 
Mexico  30.0  2006 
New Zealand  26.5  2007 
Slovak Republic  16.9  2008 
United Kingdom  24.5  2008 
United States  33.8  2008 
Source: OECD Health Data (2010). 
  Behavioral economists have taken this excessive discounting of future benefits 
relative to current costs as evidence of “time-inconsistent preferences”.
4 The preferences 
are “inconsistent” because the action taken in the previous period tends to induce the 
economic agent to regret it in some future period. To resolve that dilemma, financial 
incentives may be used to bridge the gap between short-run benefits and long-run 
costs. 
  Private and social costs can also be seen as bifurcated in this case. For instance, a 
consumer may consider the cost of obesity for his health and future financial position 
but he is not cognizant of the cost to the social health insurance system. Taking into 
account the externalized social cost may tilt his behavior towards the healthy instead of 
the injurious. This disassociation of the social from the private may also be resolved by 
levying a so-called “fat tax”—really, a negative financial incentive—so that what is 
externalized may be properly internalized. The converse is also true for financial 
rewards for healthy behavior, which interlaces the social benefit with its private 
counterpart. 
                                                           
4 For an early formal description of this problem in economics, see Strotz (1955–1956). Recently, 
health econometric research has shown that, among other causes, obesity results from 
temporal decision biases (Ikeda et al. 2010). 6 
 
  What is yet unclear is how effective financial incentives are in reconciling the 
apparent inconsistency in preferences or in forcing consumers to internalize costs and 
benefits. While one may concede in general terms that these types of incentives nudge 
people towards a healthier lifestyle, the literature has not yet settled whether financial 
“carrots” (rewards or bonuses) or “sticks” (punishments like forfeiture of a cash deposit) 
are more effective. Moreover, beyond the question of weight loss, there is also the issue 
of weight maintenance after some reduction has already been achieved. Is the weight 
lost through financial incentives kept off? We aim to shed some light on this issue by 
offering a systematic review of the current literature and assessing the quality of the 
evidence presented by the various studies. 
  As a basis for this survey, we hold the following statements as self-evident. First, 
obesity and overweight are significant correlates of a large set of diseases, including—
but not limited to—diabetes, high blood pressure, hyperlipidemia, numerous heart 
diseases, and other psychosocial problems (Mokdad et al.  2003).
5 Second, the two 
conditions are principal contributors not only to total health-care costs (see, for 
example, Bhattacharya and Sood (2005) for the US and Konnopka et al.  (2010) for 
Germany) but also to non-health-related costs, such as externalities in close quarters 
(Bhattacharya and Sood  (2011) mention the example of economy-class seats in 
passenger aircraft). Third, the overall cost—direct and indirect, pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary, internal and external—of overweight and obesity is substantial, 
notwithstanding the savings associated with the fact that obese people tend to die 
younger.
6 Finally, some individuals exhibit time-inconsistent preferences that lead them 
to engage in unhealthy behavior because they are unable to internalize the long-run 
consequences of their actions. 
2 SURVEYING THE EVIDENCE 
By examining the existing evidence, we wish to answer the following questions: “Can 
financial incentives induce weight loss and, if so, to what extent?”. Equally important, “If 
the weight loss was induced by financial incentives, can the subject maintain the new 
weight for an extended period?” 
  These questions have piqued the interest of many researchers across various 
academic disciplines. Hence, it is not surprising that numerous studies exist which 
                                                           
5 According to the WHO (2011), “44 percent of the diabetes burden, 23 percent of the ischemic 
heart-disease burden, and between 7 and 41 percent of certain cancer burdens are attributable 
to overweight and obesity.” 
6 That obese people are likely to die younger is almost never taken into account, resulting in 
overestimated costs of obesity. See, e.g., McCormick et al. (2007). 7 
 
attempt to provide credible answers. The variations in the incentive mechanism are 
almost as many as the number of studies itself. Presumably, making a direct comparison 
between and among studies along the lines of a meta-analysis will not be informative 
because of the idiosyncratic subtleties across studies. Differences in the study design, 
compliance rates, and indeed even the outcomes of interest certainly preclude such an 
approach. Instead, we conduct a narrative review of the existing literature and evaluate 
the strength of the evidence based on the quality of the study that generated it. 
  The initial source for the studies reviewed here comes from Jochelson (2007). 
She gives an overview of the use of financial incentives for giving up several habits that 
are possibly harmful for health, including those causing obesity. We supplement her 
literature review with material from Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenell (2008). Finally, we 
searched Google Scholar and the EBSCOhost Online Research Databases for other 
relevant studies using the keywords “obesity”, “incentive”, “weight”, and “payment”. The 
full list of our extensive literature search is presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
  We distinguish our evidence-based review of the literature by emphasizing the 
methodological quality of the surveyed articles and by being explicit both with respect 
to the type of monetary incentive being analyzed (carrot/positive or stick/negative) and 
with respect to the outcome (weight loss or weight maintenance after weight loss). In 
particular, we focus on the results generated by randomized controlled trials (RCTs), 
with the conviction that this provides the scientific community with the most valid 
estimate of the effect—if any—of the incentive mechanism in place.  
  In order to qualify the relative strengths of the evidence, we had to appeal to a 
generally accepted hierarchy of evidence. In this hierarchy, the highest weight is 
assigned to evidence generated by RCTs. This is in accordance with the guidelines 
adopted by the US Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF 1989) and the Centre for 
Evidence-based Medicine at the University of Oxford (CEBM  2009). Moreover, in 
evaluating health claims, the US Food and Drug Administration also accords the results 
of RCTs with the highest degree of credibility, particularly those of “double blind” RCTs 
(FDA 2009):  “Randomized  controlled  trials  offer the best assessment of a causal 
relationship between a substance and a disease because they control for known 
confounders of results (i.e., other factors that could affect risk of disease).”
7 
  An alternative approach to RCTs is the ex-post evaluation of the outcomes of 
actual policies that have been implemented to encourage weight loss. These so-called 
“observational” studies are nonexperimental and take place in an uncontrolled 
                                                           
7 Blinding, of course, is not possible in the case of financial incentives since both the researcher 
and the subject cannot be made unaware of the treatment. 8 
 
environment. In the present context, these can take on many forms and be 
implemented by various actors: among them are, for example, taxes on unhealthy foods 
or subsidies for healthy ones imposed by federal or local governments, health 
insurances offering reduced premiums to members who lose weight, or employers 
initiating employee health programs (e.g., Relton et al.  (2011) and Cawley and 
Price (2011)). Some observational studies that evaluate similar reward schemes as those 
programmed in our selected RCTs are discussed below. These studies are informative 
with respect to the feasibility of financial incentive schemes outside the laboratory 
setting. 
  Although the nonrandomized design of observational studies offers some 
insights on the effectiveness of using monetary incentives to encourage weight loss, the 
credibility of the reported effect is threatened by confounding factors such as the 
nonrandom selection into the treatment. A well-designed and well-implemented RCT 
overcomes such issues, which is why it is often referred to as the “gold standard” in 
evaluation studies.
8 
  Despite the narrow focus on RCTs, the comparisons are complicated even 
further because of the variability in reporting standards of the surveyed articles. Since 
1996, the Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials (CONSORT) has been in effect, 
which should guide researchers in reporting results of RCTs (Schulz et al. 2010).
9 This 
has not always been adhered to and has thus hampered the ability of other researchers 
to conveniently obtain a cohesive picture painted by the scattered pieces of evidence. 
  A likely reason behind the deviations from CONSORT is that the issue of obesity 
and how to combat it has elicited an interdisciplinary company of allied researchers. 
Economists, in particular, are interested in the behavioral changes induced by 
manipulating the financial incentives faced by economic agents. Whereas one might 
expect epidemiologists and other public health researchers to be familiar with 
CONSORT (although they might not necessarily follow it), economists may not be and 
hence reporting conventions fall by the wayside. 
                                                           
8 To be fair, when appropriate methods are used, one can still retrieve a meaningful estimate of 
the effect from data obtained through observational studies. See, for example, the 
methodologies discussed by Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). 
9 The latest version of CONSORT was published in 2010. In the case of nonrandomized 
experimental designs, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) provides guidelines 
under Transparent Reporting of Evaluations with Nonrandomized Designs (TREND) (Des 
Jarlais et al. 2004). 9 
 
3 INCLUSION CRITERIA AND HIERARCHY OF EVIDENCE 
Our principal inclusion criterion for an extensive discussion of the results of a study is 
its experimental design, with a special emphasis on having a genuine control group. 
Unfortunately, some studies compare two different treatments with each other without 
a third group to serve as the benchmark. The other criteria that we consider to be 
relevant for the credibility of the results are the effectiveness of randomization and the 
sample size.  Rather than direct and incontrovertible evidence, we regard the results of 
studies that do not meet these criteria as coarse measures of the true effect. We mention 
these studies where appropriate but do not discuss them at length. 
3.1 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Ideally, the study design has to be organized into two or more experimental groups, one 
of which has to be an untreated (control) group to which treatment groups can be 
compared. The outcome for the control group serves as a proxy for the corresponding 
outcome for the treatment group had the treatment, in fact, not materialized. 
Nevertheless, we allow the absence of a control group only in the following situation: 
groups may receive several treatments at the same time but the financial incentive must 
be unique to one group and the other treatments must be common to all groups. This 
setup still allows us to isolate the effect of the financial incentive despite the presence of 
the other treatments under a more restrictive—though not necessarily unreasonable—
assumption. 
  Consider the example in Table 2. If, as in Study Design 1, two groups receive the 
same Treatment  A (say, a course in healthy cooking) but Experimental Group  2, in 
addition, receives a financial incentive tied to weight loss, the effect of the incentive can 
still be recovered under the assumption that a healthy-cooking course and financial 
incentives do not have synergistic effects.
10 In this case, the effect of Treatment A is 
netted out. In Study Design 2, where two groups receive different treatments (say, a 
course in healthy cooking, Treatment  A, in Experimental Group  1 and supervised 
exercise, Treatment B, in Experimental Group 2), and one faces a financial incentive 
contingent on weight loss, the impact of the incentive may not be identified. 
Moreover, in practice, the differences between two treatment regimes are typically not 
as clear cut as our hypothetical designs in Table 2. For example, Jeffery et al. (1993a) 
seemingly identify the effect of financial incentives on weight loss but the experimental 
design does not credibly yield the effect of interest. The authors focus on providing a 
                                                           
10 More technically, we assume that the treatments enter the outcome equation additively and 
linearly. 10 
 
negative incentive to program participants.
11 The treatment involved offering employees 
a weight-loss and a smoking-cessation program. Both programs included financial 
incentives and program participation was voluntary. The weight-loss program consisted 
of four rounds of 22  weeks, wherein courses were held every two weeks, covering 
behavioral advice for weight loss. Additionally, participants chose two parameters: 
(1)  weight-loss goals of up to one  percent of their body weight in between course 
meetings and (2) amounts of at least USD 5 to be deducted from their pay if they did 
not accomplish said weight-loss goal. 
TABLE 2   
Hypothetical study designs 
  Study Design 1  Study Design 2 
Experimental Group 1  Treatment A  Treatment A  
Experimental Group 2  Treatment A + Financial Incentive  Treatment B + Financial Incentive 
Source: Own representation. 
    While employees of the treatment firms were supported and 
incentivized to lose weight and to stop smoking, firms in the control group received no 
treatment. Such a situation does not allow us to exclusively identify the effect of 
financial incentives on weight loss. The purported effect on weight could be attributed 
to the smoking-cessation program or a combination of the programs. This is likely to be 
the case since smoking cessation is associated with changes in bodyweight (Austin and 
Grotmaker 2001). 
3.2 RANDOMIZATION, COMPLIANCE, AND ATTRITION 
In the studies we focus on, participants must have been randomly assigned to the 
experimental groups. Stratified random assignment is also allowed. Assignment 
mechanisms that are susceptible to selection biases (e.g., based on punctuality at health 
course meetings, which may be related to participant motivation) are excluded. For 
example, in Jeffery et al. (1978), the control group consisted of people who refused to be 
part of the treatment group. 
  Substitution and dropout biases that threaten the study design were carefully 
considered. A substitution bias occurs when, for instance, a person assigned to the 
control group is able to seek treatment on her own. Such behavior will render a simple 
comparison of means between the two experimental groups inadequate as a measure of 
the treatment effect. Nonrandom patterns in participant attrition will also bias the 
                                                           
11 The study is uncommon and is unique among our selected articles because randomization 
was carried out at a more aggregated level. Instead of recruiting individual participants, 32 
firms are randomized into treatment and control groups. 11 
 
result. Therefore, one must be judicious in comparing studies with different 
substitution and dropout rates. 
3.3 SAMPLE SIZE 
When possible, we conduct tests to find out whether the number of observations per 
experimental group is sufficiently large to make assured statements on the effectiveness 
of financial incentives. This includes tests of whether certain assumptions (for instance, 
on sample distributions or variances), which are oftentimes made only implicitly, really 
hold.  
3.4 EXCLUSIONS 
Our interest is directed towards “output-oriented” incentives that are rewarded 
contingent on an outcome measure, such as weight. Some of the retrieved works did not 
actually require participants to pursue healthier living like, for example, Black and 
Friesen (1983) or Cameron et al. (1990), who examine financial incentives contingent on 
participants merely attending group meetings. Others incentivize an increase in 
physical activity or a change in eating habits and then measure weight loss as the 
outcome. We refer to this type of incentive scheme as “input-oriented” because the 
reward is directly linked to behavior associated with a healthy lifestyle. These studies are 
no less important than those focusing on output measures but a comparison of 
monetary incentives for a target weight with a similar incentive for increased exercise 
addresses a slightly different question. 
3.5 FURTHER DISTINCTIONS 
For the included studies, we distinguish between those that examine (a) incentives for 
weight loss, (b)  incentives to maintain the reduced body weight, and (c)  the 
sustainability of weight loss (i.e., whether participants are able to maintain the weight 
they reached under an incentive program when the incentives are no longer present). 
  Another characteristic along which earlier attempts differ is the type of 
incentives they offer. The most important distinction here is the one between negative 
and positive incentives. In the context of experimental research, negative incentives 
typically consist of initial cash deposits paid by the participants which are refundable 
contingent on the exhibition of the desired behavior. They therefore confront 
participants with the risk of losing money if they do not accomplish certain predefined 
goals (e.g., losing a certain amount of body weight). Positive incentives are those 
incentive schemes that offer a reward for the accomplishment of goals. This could be in 
the form of direct cash payments or a lottery. 12 
 
  We do not exclude either of these incentive regimes but acknowledge the 
necessity to carefully differentiate between the two. Given that participation in this kind 
of program is voluntary, participants in programs with negative incentives may need to 
have higher levels of motivation than participants facing positive incentives. Under a 
regime of negative incentives, failure to achieve the target is met with a reduction in 
utility; with positive incentives, participants end up—in the worst case—at the same 
utility level at which they started. Moreover, people tend to have an asymmetric 
evaluation of gains and losses. The possibility of losing money is given much more 
weight than an equal chance of gaining the same amount of money. This phenomenon, 
called “loss aversion”, has long been documented in the literature (see, e.g., Tversky and 
Kahnemann (1991)). 
  Finally, we acknowledge the setting in which the experiment takes place. 
Incentive schemes may work quite differently depending on the context in which they 
operate. For instance, participants of workplace programs may have the necessary social 
support to succeed in weight loss. This social network is likely to be absent in the 
laboratory setting. 
4 RESULTS 
Of the 22 studies reviewed here, only nine strictly met the inclusion criteria of which 
only five found that the financial incentives had any effect on the participants. Three 
studies which we consider to be relevant contributions are discussed below although 
they did not meet the inclusion criteria. 
  Studies that involve the use of positive incentives for weight loss include 
Finkelstein et al. (2007) and Jeffery et al. (1993b). The former provide evidence that 
positive financial incentives work while the latter is more ambivalent, suggesting that 
the free provision of healthy food choices is more effective at inducing weight loss. 
  Saccone and Israel (1978), Israel and Saccone (1979), Mahoney (1974), and Jeffery 
et al. (1984a) test the effectiveness of negative incentives for weight loss. Saccone and 
Israel (1978) provide some evidence that negative incentives could work but it is hard to 
interpret the effect as resulting only from the incentive mechanism in place since other 
factors, such as the identity of the disburser, may have had an influence. However, in 
general, negative incentives seem to be effective in encouraging weight loss but it does 
not seem to have a significant impact on maintaining the achieved weight losses for an 
extended period. 
  Volpp et al.  (2008) and John et al.  (2011) combine positive and negative 
incentives for weight loss. The results indicate that the combination of carrots and 
sticks encourages people to lose weight. However, the sustainability of such a weight 13 
 
loss is doubtful. John et al. provide evidence that the incentives may work in the short to 
medium run but does not continue to help people keep the weight off. 
  With respect to the three studies that did not strictly meet the inclusion criteria, 
Kramer et al. (1986) address the question of whether financial incentives can be used to 
encourage people to maintain their weight after they have already lost a substantial part 
of it. Jeffery et al. (1983) analyze whether the amount of the bonus plays a role for the 
effectiveness of positive financial incentives for weight loss. Cawley and Price (2011) use 
observational data from an employer to investigate the effect on enrollment, attrition, 
and weight loss of a bonus program. 
  Table 3 gives an overview of the studies we reviewed and how we classified them 
with regard to type of incentive, incentivized behavior, and focus of the study. Volpp et 
al. (2008) and John et al. (2010) are not included in the table because they analyze a 
mixture of positive and negative incentives and could therefore not be exclusively 
positioned. 
TABLE 3 
A taxonomy for studies on the link between financial incentives and obesity and overweight 
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Positive incentive  Finkelstein et al. (2007) 
Jeffery et al. (1983)* 
Jeffery et al. (1993b) 
Cawley and Price 
(2011)* 
—  Jeffery et al. (1993b) 
 
* These studies did not meet the inclusion criteria. 
Source: Studies selected by authors. 
4.1 POSITIVE INCENTIVES 
Finkelstein et al. (2007) ostensibly test different levels of monetary rewards. They use a 
sample of 207 participants which they randomly assign to three experimental groups 
(see Table 4). The experiment is divided into two three-month phases. In the first phase, 14 
 
one group (“front-loaded” group, N  =  64) received USD  14 per percentage point of 
weight lost. The second group (“steady-payment” group, N = 71) received USD 7, and the 
third group (“back-loaded” group, N = 72) received no reward. In the second phase, the 
second group’s reward stayed the same, whereas the incentive structure of the other two 
rotated. While the front-loaded group received no reward, the back-loaded group 
received the reward of USD 14 per percentage point weight loss from baseline. As an 
example, if a participant from the steady-payment group lost 5 percentage points of 
their baseline weight, they would receive USD 35 and a further USD 35 if they maintain 
their weight six months after the start of the program. If this same participant were in 
the back-loaded group, she would receive nothing at three months and USD 70 at six 
months. In both cases, the participant would exit the program with USD 70. 
For the first three months, Finkelstein et al. find front-loaded participants to 
lose more weight in absolute terms and to be more likely to lose at least five percent of 
their body weight than the back-loaded group. Both findings are statistically significant 
at the five-percent level. The same is true for steady-payment participants albeit this 
effect is not statistically significant. The analysis controls for age, sex, race, university 
education, and different levels of obesity at baseline. 
TABLE 4   
Study design of Finkelstein et al. (2007) 
Experimental group 
Reward schedule 
(USD per percentage point of weight loss) 
First phase  Second phase 
Front-loaded Group  14  0 
Steady-payment Group  7 7 
Back-loaded Group  0  14 
Source: Own representation. 
  While group assignment was randomized, we remain unconvinced that the 
authors are able to credibly quantify the effect of the monetary incentive on weight loss. 
The back-loaded group cannot serve as a control group because, at the outset, they are 
made aware of the monetary rewards at the end of the second phase. In other words, all 
groups were incentivized to lose weight from the very beginning. In order to maximize 
the payout at the end of the study period, the back-loaded group may have already 
engaged in weight-reducing activities during the first phase, thereby rendering any 
comparison of the first-phase results with the other experimental groups rather 
inappropriate.
12 
                                                           
12 A similar phenomenon was first documented by Ashenfelter  (1978) when examining 
participation in training programs. Ashenfelter observed that the wages of participants in a 15 
 
  Another limitation is the high dropout rate in the study (the back-loaded group 
had an attrition rate of 36 and 50 percent after three and six months, respectively). 
Finkelstein et al. show that the odds of attending the weigh-in were, in both phases, 
significantly higher for those groups receiving rewards for that phase. They deal with 
the problem of attrition by pursuing an intent-to-treat approach—that is, by assuming 
that the dropouts returned to their baseline weight. Of course, there is no compelling 
reason to assume that this was indeed the case. An alternative would have been to 
exclude them from the analysis or, even better, to model participant attrition itself and 
use this information to correct their estimates. Unfortunately, a comparison of the 
results with and without the dropouts was not reported. 
  The results from the first phase can be seen as a weak indication of the 
effectiveness of positive financial incentives in encouraging weight loss. That the back-
loaded group could have begun to lose weight at the start of the first phase implies that 
the significant impact found for the front-loaded group is likely to be underestimated. 
In other words, compared to a genuine treatment group, the magnitude of the effect 
may even be larger. We hesitate to interpret further the results from the second phase 
since we are unconvinced that it adequately addresses the question of the sustainability 
of financial incentives to induce weight loss. The reason for this is that there is no 
genuine control group whose weight trajectory could serve as a benchmark. 
  In Jeffery et al. (1993b), four different treatments are tested on a comparatively 
large sample of 202 participants for 18 months in total. They were randomly assigned to 
one control group and four treatment groups, each consisting of roughly 40 
participants. The study design is presented in Table  5. All of the treatment groups 
received a “standard behaviobral treatment” (SBT)—essentially, weight-loss advice. The 
meetings were held weekly for 20 weeks and once a month thereafter. In one group, the 
SBT was combined with providing participants specially prepared meals for free to assist 
with weight loss. Another group obtained the SBT plus a financial incentive. The last 
treatment group received a combination of all three treatments. 
As a positive financial incentive, participants assigned to Treatment Groups 3 and 4 
were rewarded USD 2.50 if they did not gain any weight from one week to another, 
USD 12.50 if they achieved 50 percent of their personal weekly weight loss goal, and 
USD 25 if they fully achieved it. The weekly weight-loss goals were fractions of an overall 
goal (one of 14, 18, or 23 kg) that participants chose for the whole study period. The 
analysis is based on weight at baseline and after six, 12, and 18 months. Only individuals 
that completed all three follow-ups were included in the analysis. Attrition, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
training program exhibited a dip (hence, the phenomenon is called “Ashenfelter’s dip”) right 
before they entered the program. 16 
 
was nontrivial. In the SBT and the combined incentive groups, only 65 and 85 percent, 
respectively, could be included. 
TABLE 5   
Study design of Jeffery et al. (1993b) 
Experimental Group  Treatment 
Control None 
Treatment Group 1  Standard behavioral treatment (SBT) 
Treatment Group 2  SBT + free healthy meals 
Treatment Group 3  SBT + financial incentive 
Treatment Group 4  SBT + free healthy meals + financial incentive 
Source: Own representation. 
  The  authors  find  that  financial  incentives, unlike food provision, had no 
significant effect on weight loss. While at six months, Treatment Group  3 had lost 
0.13 kg/m
2 (BMI units) more than Treatment Group 1, at 18 months, Treatment Group 1 
had lost 0.26 kg/m
2 more than Treatment Groups 3 compared to baseline.
13 Both groups 
regained weight after the sixth month.
14 Significantly more successful at all weigh-ins 
were Treatment Groups 3 and 4, suggesting that the free provision of food tailored for 
weight loss is preferable to financial rewards or standard behavioral treatment.  
  There are two major limitations of Jeffery et al. (1993b). First, participants of 
Treatment Groups 3 and 4 were allowed to set their own weight-loss goal. It is likely that 
participants of the incentive groups set lower weight-loss goals than participants in the 
SBT group in order to have a higher likelihood to be rewarded. Thus, everything else 
constant, the expected weight loss at six, 12, and 18 months is lower for members of the 
incentive groups. Second, the attrition rates are high and different between groups. If 
unsuccessful participants have a higher likelihood to not show up at 18 months, the 
attrition rate of the SBT group should be higher because they have higher weight-loss 
goals. This hypothesis is supported by the data: in Treatment Group 1, the attrition rate 
is considerably higher than in the Treatment Group 3. Thus, it is likely that the effect of 
financial incentives for weight loss is biased towards zero. 
                                                           
13 Note that Treatment Group 1 is the adequate comparison group for the incentive group. The 
reason for this is that the “Controls” received no treatment at all while Treatment Group 3 
received the SBT. 
14 The authors remark that an analysis including subjects who were present at the 18-month 
follow-up and inputting all missing data from adjacent values yielded qualitatively similar 
results yet the results are neither discussed nor reported. An intention-to-treat analysis for all 
observations was not carried out. However, intention-to-treat results would be helpful to get an 
impression about the relevance of the attrition problem for the effect estimates. 17 
 
4.2 NEGATIVE INCENTIVES 
Saccone and Israel (1978) carry out a controlled experiment in order to find out whether 
input- or output-oriented incentives are more effective and whether financial refunds 
granted by people with which the participant has a strong personal relationship have 
different effects than financial rewards granted by external therapists. 
  The empirical analysis is based on a sample of 49 overweight adults aged 16–
56 years who exhibit body weights at least 15 percent above the recommended level, to 
which a significant other in the participant’s family is available and who were willing to 
post a USD 35 deposit. Participants were randomly allocated (stratified by degree of 
overweight) into seven groups, one of which served as the control group. While the 
control group (N = 5) did not receive any treatment, all six treatment groups took part 
in a nine-week course which provided information on how to monitor food intake, how 
to establish a nutritionally sound diet, how to exercise, etc.   
TABLE 6   
Study design of Saccone and Israel (1978) 
Experimental Group  Treatment 
Control None 
Treatment Group 1  Program only: weight 
Treatment Group 2  Program only: behavior 
Treatment Group 3  Therapist: weight  
Treatment Group 4  Therapist: behavior 
Treatment Group 5  Significant other: weight 
Treatment Group 6  Significant other: behavior 
Source: Own representation. 
  In addition to course participation, two of these groups were requested to 
monitor on a daily basis body weight (Treatment Group 2, N = 6) or eating behavior 
(Treatment Group 3, N = 8). Yet, none of these groups were exposed to any financial 
incentives. During the final six weeks of the program, participants of any of the four 
remaining treatment groups (Treatment Groups 1, 4, 5, and 6) could achieve a refund of 
up to USD 5 per week. These groups differ in (i) whether the premium is refunded for 
successful weight loss (Treatment Groups 1 and 4) or for compliance in eating behavior 
(Treatment Groups 5 and 6) and (ii) whether the refund is paid directly by the therapist 
(Treatment Groups 1 and 5) or through a significant other (in most cases, the spouse; 
Treatment Groups 4 and 6) who also monitors the participant. Moreover, they attend a 
session where instructions for helping the participant might be given to the spouse. The 
sizes of these groups are between seven and eight members. 18 
 
For all six treatment groups, the authors find a statistically significant decrease 
in weight over the treatment period of nine weeks. For the control group, an 
insignificant increase in body weight is found. 
  To address the effectiveness of financial incentives contingent on weight loss, 
the control group is not the appropriate reference group. While the control group 
indeed did not receive any treatment, the incentive groups received additional 
treatments other than the incentive itself. We are thus unable to isolate the exclusive 
impact of the financial incentive. A more appropriate comparison is between Treatment 
Group 1  and  Treatment  Group 2  (or  between  Treatment  Group 2  and  Treatment 
Group 4). 
  A comparison with all participants who could achieve a refund (irrespective of 
whether weight loss or changes in behavior was rewarded) yields a significant and 
negative effect of financial incentives on body weight. Yet, the more relevant pairwise 
comparisons between the course-only groups and each of the groups exposed to 
financial incentives yields an ambiguous picture. On one hand, a very small and 
insignificant effect is found for refunds granted for successful weight loss. On the other 
hand, participants who were refunded for compliance with nutritional advice were 
significantly more successful in reducing body weight than participants of the course-
only groups. Another interesting result is that being refunded for compliance by 
someone to whom the participant has a strong personal relationship exerts a much 
stronger effect than being rewarded by the therapist. 
  Though yielding quite interesting and statistically significant results, the study 
still suffers from the very small number of observations that might limit opportunities 
for generalizing these results. Nevertheless, the finding that assigning a role to the 
participant’s spouse or a significant other matters for the effect of financial incentives 
appears to be quite relevant. It suggests that changing eating habits represents a social 
(family) rather than an individual decision that cannot be effectively influenced on a 
purely individual basis. Moreover, the authors conclude that monetary reinforcement of 
a change in eating behavior is more effective than weight loss as the target behavior of 
the incentive. 
  In a follow-up study, Israel and Saccone (1979) required the participants of the 
six treatment groups to return for weigh-ins at three and 12 months in order to receive 
the remainder of a USD  35 deposit. During this time, they did not receive any 
treatment. The basic result is that, at both follow-ups, the financial incentive scheme 
did not result in weight-loss maintenance. This means that they are effective only on a 
short time horizon. This would point at financial incentives being even harmful for 
long-term weight loss. The authors report that a more promising long-term treatment is 
a monetary reinforcement for behavioral change through a family member or person in 19 
 
the participant’s natural environment. However, the very small number of observations 
and an attrition rate of 14 percent limit the informative value of the study.
15 
  Mahoney (1974) uses negative incentives in two of three randomized 
experimental groups to address the twin issues of weight loss and the maintenance of 
weight loss. After attending group meetings at the time of project initiation, during two 
baseline weeks, all participants recorded their daily weight and eating habits and 
attended weekly weigh-ins. During the following six treatment weeks, they received 
standardized weight-loss and habit-improvement goals, i.e., quality, quantity, and 
timing as well as location of food consumption. In addition, two groups were instructed 
to award themselves portions of their own deposit (USD 35) depending on achieved 
weight-loss goals (N = 13)  and  habit-improvement  goals  (N  =  11). The control group 
consisted of 14 participants. Nine weeks after the termination of the treatment phase, 
participants had a final weigh-in. 
  The author finds significant weight losses for all groups during the two baseline 
weeks. In the intervention phase, the self-reward group for habit improvement (“input-
oriented”) lost 3.8 lbs. more than the control group and 3.3 percent more than the self-
reward group for weight loss (“output-oriented”). The latter, however, did not lose 
significantly more weight than the control group. After a further nine weeks, all groups 
were successful in maintaining the weight losses attained at the end of treatment and 
did not differ in this respect. 
  Despite excellent weigh-in attendance rates, this analysis has substantial 
limitations. First, control subjects reported their pre-program weight problems as being 
of shorter duration than the incentive groups—implying better weight-loss chances—
probably resulting in downward-biased effect estimates. Second, the power of the 
employed statistical Mann–Whitney test fails to reach conventional thresholds of 80 or 
90  percent. This means that no conclusion regarding the ineffectiveness of output-
oriented financial incentive schemes can be drawn. In other words, there remains a 
large risk of being wrong in rejecting the hypothesis of the effectiveness of deposits on 
weight-loss goals for weight reduction. 
  Jeffery et al. (1984a) analyze both weight loss and its sustainability. Sixty women 
and 55 men were recruited from a representative sample and through a newspaper 
advertisement. Women and men had to be overweight by at least 20 lbs. and 30 lbs., 
respectively. The overweight served as the weight-loss goal as well. The participants were 
randomly assigned to three different treatment groups, of which two required an initial 
                                                           
15 Although the authors mention that there appears to be no relationship between success in the 
program and attrition and that dropouts were unrelated to the treatment conditions. 20 
 
deposit of USD 150: (1) a control group, (2) a contract group receiving a USD 30 refund 
for each five-pound increment of average group weight loss, (3) a second contract group 
receiving refunds of USD 5, USD 10, USD 20, USD 40, and USD 75 for successive five-
pound individual incremental weight loss. The treatment period was 16 weeks. During 
that time, weekly group meetings covering nutritional, exercise, and behavioral 
principles were held. Sustainability of weight loss was addressed by randomly assigning 
participants to two different maintenance treatments which did not involve further 
financial incentives. No follow-up comparison between the treatment groups of the 
weight loss phase was carried out, i.e., the long-term effect of financial incentives were 
not analyzed. Thus, we exclusively concentrate on the results for the weight loss phase. 
  Attrition was generally low with only 11 subjects providing self-reported weight, 
to which the authors added 5  lbs. Employing multivariate ANOVA techniques with 
gender and the recruitment source as covariates, they find that percentage weight loss 
was significantly higher in both the constant-contract groups (10.8  percent) and the 
increasing-contract group (12.8 percent) compared to the control group (8.5 percent). 
The contract conditions did not differ significantly. Weight loss was unaffected by 
recruitment source although it was hypothesized that self-referrals (newspaper 
recruitment) would perform worse because they were more likely to have participated 
in prior weight-loss programs and were, on average, older. 
  Comparability to other studies is limited because participants were also offered 
to attend weekly group meetings. Moreover, attendance in the weekly group meetings 
differed significantly across groups, with the contract group performing better. Thus, it 
is unclear how much of the outcome differential is due to group meeting attendance. It 
is most likely that the observed treatment effect would be smaller in the absence of such 
group meetings. 
4.3 MIXED INCENTIVES 
In a relatively recent study, Volpp et al.  (2008) test the effectiveness of financial 
incentives for weight loss among patients at a veterans’ medical center. Consequently, 
the sample is mostly male, which limits the generalizability of the results. However, it 
remains interesting because of its atypical incentive scheme. 
  Volpp et al. use an interesting mixture of negative and positive incentives. They 
assigned 57 participants equally to three experimental groups, all receiving the same 
basic weight-monitoring program involving monthly weigh-ins, and with one serving as 
the control group. In the first treatment group, participants had to put in a stake from 
their own money, which was forfeited if their weight-loss goal of 1 lb. a week for 16 weeks 
was not reached. In contrast, if they reached their weight-loss goal, they could earn 
extra rewards up to USD  252 per month depending on their deposits. In another 21 
 
treatment group, participants who reached their weight-loss goal qualified for a lottery 
with an expected bonus of around USD 90 per month. 
  The analysis is based on an intent-to-treat approach, i.e., dropouts were 
assumed to have returned to their baseline weight. In the control group, all participants 
completed the trial. In the deposit and lottery groups, 10  percent and 15  percent 
dropped out, respectively. Members of both treatment groups were found to have lost 
significantly more weight (4 lbs.) than the control participants and to have a higher 
likelihood of achieving the weight-loss goal. There is no significant difference in 
outcomes between both treatment groups. As a follow-up, Volpp et al. weighed 
participants again seven months after the start of the experiment. Dropout rates 
increased even further across the board. The results did not yield any statistical 
difference between the three groups.  
  The limitation of this study is that the observed effects may be either due to the 
financial incentive or the enhanced attention of the medical center for intervention-
group members. Although the authors suggest that the weight-monitoring program is 
the same for all groups, it becomes clear later on that only the incentive participants had 
daily call-ins and feedback. Moreover, only members of this group had to weigh 
themselves each day, thus keeping better track of the weight trajectory. If monitoring 
per se induces participants to lose weight, it is impossible to isolate the effect of the 
financial incentive itself. Therefore, the effects are most likely overestimated. 
Additionally, assuming that the dropouts returned to their baseline weights also 
contributes to an overestimation of the treatment effect. 
  A similar experiment to Volpp et al.  (2008)—in the sense that a mixture of 
positive and negative incentives was in play—was carried out by John et al. (2011). This is 
based on voluntary participation in a deposit–reward scheme. Participants were allowed 
to choose individual deposits with values up to USD 3 per day. However, participants 
could receive awards that exceed their deposits. 
  Sixty-six obese veterans confined at the Philadelphia Veterans Affairs Medical 
Center, aged between 30 and 70, took part in the experiment. All of them participated 
in a course where strategies for weight loss were discussed and a uniform weight-loss 
target of 24 lbs. in 24 weeks was set. After the treatment period, the authors initiated an 
eight-week maintenance phase, wherein participants were not required to lose further 
weight, and thereafter a 36-week follow-up phase. 
  Participants were randomly allocated (stratified by sex and age) to (i) a control 
group whose members participated in a program but was not exposed to any financial 
incentive (Control), (ii) a incentive treatment group for which the eight weeks of the 
maintenance phase were explicitly framed as a period for weight-loss maintenance 22 
 
(Treatment Group 1), and (iii) an alternative incentive treatment group for which the 
entire period of 32 weeks was framed as a weight-loss period, i.e., the maintenance 
phase was not explicitly declared as such (Treatment Group 2).  
  The financial incentive scheme was designed as follows: for each day that 
participants of Treatment Groups 1 and 2 reported a weight equal to or below their daily 
weight-loss goal, they received twice the daily deposit (if they passed the verification of 
weight at the end of each month). “Thus, these participants could earn USD 84 net 
(USD 185 gross) per month (i.e., by making the maximum USD 3 daily deposit, and on 
every day of the month, truthfully reporting that they had attained their daily weight-
loss goal).” In contrast, if they did not achieve the daily weight-loss goal, the deposit is 
forfeited. After each month, the target trajectory of weight loss was adjusted such that 
the final goal of 24 lbs. of weight loss could be achieved by constant daily weight loss 
during the rest of the treatment period.  
  Two outcome variables were considered: (i)  weight loss after 32 weeks and 
(ii) weight maintenance 36 weeks after the end of the intervention period. The attrition 
rate was 10 percent at 32 weeks and 35 percent at the end of the intervention period. It 
did not significantly differ across treatment states at both weigh-ins. The analysis was 
carried out as an intention-to-treat analysis. 
  The two incentive groups did not exhibit significant deviations in weight loss 
after 32  weeks, most probably indicating that there is simply no framing effect. 
However, taking the two groups together, average weight loss for the combined group far 
exceeds the corresponding value for the control group. During the follow-up period, 
substantial weight regain was found particularly for the treatment groups although the 
latter still achieved an average net weight loss of 1.2 lbs. between enrollment in the study 
and the long-term follow-up. In contrast, the average net weight loss of the control 
group was 0.3 lbs. Nevertheless, for the entire period of 68 weeks (32 plus 36 weeks), 
average weight loss did not exhibit a significant treatment–control differential. 
  The experiment yields two clear-cut results: (i)  financial incentives work for 
achieving medium-term reductions in body weight but (ii) weight loss that has been 
achieved by the means of financial incentives is not sustainable after incentives are 
terminated.  
  Since all participants other than those from the control group were exposed to a 
mixture of positive and negative financial incentives, the question of their differential 
efficacy cannot be adequately addressed. The assumption of dropouts returning to their 
baseline weight will likely lead to an overestimation of the treatment. Crucially, only the 
incentive participants had to weigh themselves daily and call in their weight for 
immediate feedback, likely contributing to the overestimation of the impact.  23 
 
4.4 RELEVANT STUDIES THAT DID NOT MEET THE INCLUSION CRITERIA 
There are three studies that we think deserve to be mentioned although they do not fit 
the criteria to be included in the detailed review. One is an observational study. The 
others investigate the importance of the amount of the bonus and the power of 
financial incentives to encourage participants to maintain their weight after having lost 
a significant amount of it within a randomized controlled design, respectively.  
  Kramer et al. (1986) randomly assigned 85 participants of a 15-week weight-loss 
program that had been conducted earlier into three experimental groups (two 
treatment groups and one control group) using stratified randomization by sex. These 
participants lost 10 percent or more of their body weight in the previous weight-loss 
program. 
  The authors used a negative incentive scheme. In both treatment groups, 
participants paid a deposit of USD  120. In one group (N = 29),  they  were  refunded 
USD  10 each month for one year if they attended a special skills training aimed at 
improving knowledge on eating and exercises which support weight maintenance. In 
the other group (N = 28), they were refunded the same amount if they weighed not 
more than the week before and attended 12 monthly meetings. These meetings followed 
a nonspecific problem-solving format where participants initiated discussions about 
maintenance progress and problems. The control group received no contact except a six-
month reminder letter and the scheduling contact for the one-year follow-up. 
  Twenty percent of the weight-contract participants refused to attend the final 
weigh-in at 12  months after treatment initiation but provided self-reported weight 
information. The authors added 5 lbs. to the self-reported weights to adjust for possible 
reporting bias. The other groups did not have such refusals and the difference in refusal 
of the follow-up clinical visit was statistically significant. 
  Kramer et al. find that all groups regained considerable amounts of weight 
averaging at about 40 percent of the original weight loss. The weight gains were not 
statistically different between each of the groups. However, the variance of weight loss 
was larger in the control group compared to the treatment, pointing at the latter being 
superior in case of risk-averse subjects. The authors further document a twice-as-big 
maintenance success rate in the weight-contract group than in the control and the other 
treatment (attendance only) group. However, due to the low number of observations, 
both differences are statistically insignificant.  
  A critical limitation of the study is that the control group did not attend 
monthly meetings. Since the incentive participants received not only the financial-
incentive treatment but also interacted with the other incentive participants during 24 
 
these meetings, the effect of the deposit cannot be singled out. Thus, it remains unclear 
whether the discussions about maintenance progress and problems counteracted the 
positive effect of the deposit contract for weight maintenance. Likewise, it may have 
helped participants to maintain lost weight. 
  The study of Jeffery et al. (1983) was not included because it does not have a 
“genuine” control group. They have six treatment groups that differ with respect to two 
dimensions: (i) group vs. individual contract and (ii) USD 30 vs. USD 150 vs. USD 300 
deposit with refunds contingent on contractual target-weight achievement. The 
innovative design is that in the group contract interventions, participants were refunded 
conditional on the performance of the whole group. 
  The authors observe significantly greater weight losses for the group contracts 
during the treatment phase and at follow-up. In contrast, the amount of deposit was not 
significantly related to weight loss. Although in terms of percentage of participants 
achieving the contracted goal, groups with higher deposits performed significantly 
better at the end of the treatment phase. This effect did not persist at the three-month 
and 12-month follow-ups. 
  Although this study also faces serious limitations such as, for instance, high 
attrition rates, it confirms previous results of higher financial incentives not translating 
proportionally into weight loss success (we did not observe that studies with larger 
rewards report a higher effectiveness of their respective incentive groups) and that other 
control mechanisms play an important role. Here, the group contract and in Saccone 
and Israel (1978) the assignment of a role to the participant’s spouse or a significant 
other matters for the effectiveness of the financial incentives. 
  To investigate enrollment, attrition and weight loss, Cawley and Price (2011) 
analyze data from a real-world intervention. The data originate from one company that 
operates a weight loss program in 17 worksites. They comprise 2,407 employees who 
signed up for participation. The program included email and call-center support as well 
as quarterly weigh-ins. The worksites could choose one out of three program features 
that varied according to incentive schedules to lose weight. As a consequence, the 
employee’s enrollment options were limited to the one worksite-specific program 
feature. 
  While program Feature 1 offered quarterly rewards for weight loss, the other 
consisted of a deposit contract scheme (Feature  2) where participants committed 
themselves to pay a monthly deposit which they redeemed at the end of the year 
contingent on the achievement of a certain weight-loss goal, and a basic feature 
(Control) that did not schedule any financial incentive. Cawley and Price distinguish 
three treatment groups: participants of Feature 1, Feature 2, and Control. Overall, about 25 
 
20  percent of the employees participated in the program.
16 They find the smallest 
enrollment rate for Treatment Group 2 but the difference from the other groups is not 
significant. The highest attrition rate is observed for participants of Treatment Group 1 
(76.4 percent). From Treatment Group 2, only 42.6  percent completed the program 
although significantly more than in Treatment Group 1. Compared to the control group, 
both treatment groups had a significantly higher dropout rate. 
  Assuming that the dropouts returned to their baseline weights, Treatment 
Group 2 had lost more weight than the other groups. However, only the difference from 
the control group in the fourth quarter is significant. 
  Their results with respect to the effectiveness of the financial incentive schemes 
have to be interpreted very cautiously because individuals were not randomly assigned 
to different incentive schedules. The authors make clear that the observed effects may 
be either due to the financial incentive or the self-selection into the weight-loss 
program. This means that the estimated effects may reflect the selection of worksites 
into specific incentive types whose attractiveness and, in turn, enrollment shares most 
likely depend on the employee’s unobserved individual characteristics. 
  Nevertheless, this study is still better designed for identifying effects of financial 
rewards on weight loss than other studies analyzing real world interventions. As an 
example, in analyzing the “pounds for pounds” pilot program carried out in the NHS in 
southeast England, Relton et al. (2011) compare groups of participants where group 
membership is entirely endogenous. The endogeneity stems either from individuals 
being allowed to choose the characteristics of their individual weight-loss plans or from 
using dropouts as the comparison group. 
  But what can we learn from their study? That program attrition is not only a 
serious problem in the trials but also for their real word implementation and that the 
program design has a huge impact on that. Deposit contracts seem to reduce this 
problem, although it comes with lower enrollment rates, which were, overall, 
unexpectedly high. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The aim of this review was to gather the evidence in the literature on the effectiveness of 
financial incentives in promoting weight loss. To do that, we examined results from 
randomized controlled trials obtained from a systematic literature review. What is new 
in our work is that we focus on obesity treatment (in contrast to Jochelson (2007), who 
                                                           
16 Employees with a BMI less than 25 kg/m
2 might have enrolled but would not receive any 
payout. 26 
 
surveys the effectiveness of financial incentives in manipulating health behavior in 
general) and that we more carefully distinguished what was incentivized and how it was 
incentivized (compared to Paul-Ebhohimhen and Avenell (2008)). We also adhered to a 
specific hierarchy of evidence to evaluate the credibility of the reported effects in the 
literature. 
  In general, the body of evidence does not point in only one direction. The issue 
of financial incentives and weight loss is complicated because the extant studies do not 
answer the same question. While some examine positive incentives, others turn their 
attention to negative ones—still, some combine both. Many researchers incentivize 
healthy behavior while others directly tie the incentive to the output measure. Table 3 
therefore serves as a useful lens through which these studies can be examined. 
  With respect to the evaluation of output-oriented incentive schemes, the results 
are precocious. The majority of studies report a positive effect of monetary incentives on 
weight performance. Indeed, the most credible studies (i.e., Jeffery (1984a), Volpp et 
al.  (2008), and John et al. (2011)) support this view. However, considerable doubt 
remains with respect to the sustainability of any weight loss achieved through financial 
incentives.  
  Incentives for the maintenance of weight are a generally under-researched field. 
Kramer et al. (1986) explicitly analyze weight maintenance and provide evidence that 
people regain up to 40 percent of the weight they have initially lost and that negative 
financial incentives do not seem to prevent this phenomenon. The experimental design, 
however, is far from ideal. Therefore, further research in that field is necessary to settle 
the issue. 
  Despite the puzzles mentioned above, it seems implausible to dismiss financial 
incentives as a means to reduce overweight or obesity altogether. Rather than that, the 
evidence suggests that there is some effect but that the literature has not fully detected 
how it comes about and on what it depends. Ultimately, the evidence on the 
effectiveness of financial incentives for weight loss has not been convincingly settled for 
one side or the other. This is mostly due to the lack of methodological rigor and the 
conservative sample sizes. 
  Future research on the topic should be more careful to clearly define what 
behavior is incentivized (input vs. output orientation, weight loss vs. maintenance) and 
how it is incentivized (positive vs. negative incentives). A large-scale randomized 
experiment is necessary to test hypotheses about these potential effects. Finally, to 
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e
i
g
h
t
 
i
n
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
(
u
n
d
e
r
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
)
 
 
 
4
 
H
a
r
r
i
s
 
a
n
d
 
B
r
u
n
e
r
 
(
1
9
7
1
)
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
:
 
U
S
A
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
:
 
B
M
I
 
(
m
e
a
n
)
 
k
g
/
m
²
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
,
 
m
e
a
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
o
f
 
1
6
5
 
l
b
s
 
(
E
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
 
1
)
 
a
n
d
 
1
4
4
 
l
b
s
 
(
E
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
 
2
)
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
:
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
i
n
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
 
i
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
a
n
d
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
1
2
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
(
f
i
r
s
t
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
)
 
o
r
 
1
6
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
(
s
e
c
o
n
d
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
)
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
b
y
 
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
:
 
F
i
r
s
t
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
 
(
n
=
3
2
)
 
a
)
 
n
=
 
1
2
,
 
 
s
e
l
f
-
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
$
 
0
,
5
 
t
o
 
1
/
 
i
n
t
e
n
d
e
d
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
b
)
 
n
=
1
2
,
 
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
o
n
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
 
c
)
 
n
=
1
2
,
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
,
 
d
r
o
p
p
e
d
 
o
u
t
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
l
y
.
 
S
e
c
o
n
d
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
 
(
n
=
1
8
)
 
a
)
 
n
=
8
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
o
n
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
 
b
)
 
n
=
7
,
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
c
)
 
n
=
6
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
g
r
o
u
p
,
 
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
d
 
t
o
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
e
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
w
a
s
 
r
e
a
s
s
i
g
n
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
t
w
o
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
1
0
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
:
 
 
1
.
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
E
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
 
1
:
 
(
i
)
 
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
i
n
 
b
o
t
h
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
,
 
(
i
i
)
 
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
-
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
t
h
a
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
o
n
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
.
 
 
E
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
 
2
:
 
N
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
)
:
 
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
c
a
n
 
s
e
t
 
o
w
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
g
o
a
l
s
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
p
e
r
 
p
o
u
n
d
 
l
o
s
t
.
 
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
c
o
n
f
o
u
n
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
 
(
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
d
o
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
 
s
u
c
h
 
a
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
,
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
i
s
o
n
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
c
a
n
 
o
n
l
y
 
b
e
 
m
a
d
e
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
s
)
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J
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t
 
a
l
.
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o
u
n
t
r
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S
A
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
:
 
B
M
I
 
k
g
/
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o
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b
e
t
w
e
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3
0
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6
-
3
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5
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
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t
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s
t
r
a
t
e
g
i
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
i
m
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c
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n
c
e
 
a
n
d
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n
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-
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e
r
m
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e
i
g
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o
s
s
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n
 
o
b
e
s
e
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u
t
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
2
4
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
b
y
 
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
:
 
a
)
 
n
=
 
4
0
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
d
i
e
t
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
e
r
c
i
s
e
,
 
c
a
l
o
r
i
e
 
i
n
t
a
k
e
 
d
i
a
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
i
g
h
-
i
n
s
.
 
P
r
o
g
r
e
s
s
 
r
e
v
i
e
w
s
 
a
n
d
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
(
S
)
 
b
)
 
n
=
 
4
1
,
 
S
+
 
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
e
d
 
t
h
r
i
c
e
 
w
e
e
k
l
y
 
w
a
l
k
 
s
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
(
E
)
 
c
)
 
n
=
 
4
2
,
 
S
+
 
E
+
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
a
i
n
e
r
 
t
o
 
r
e
m
i
n
d
 
a
n
d
 
w
a
l
k
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
(
T
)
 
d
)
 
n
=
 
3
7
,
 
S
+
 
E
+
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
f
o
r
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
e
x
e
r
c
i
s
e
 
s
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
$
1
 
t
o
 
$
3
 
p
e
r
 
w
a
l
k
 
s
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
(
I
)
 
e
)
 
n
=
3
6
,
 
S
+
 
E
+
 
T
+
 
I
.
 
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
1
8
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
:
 
 
1
.
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
 
2
.
 
P
s
y
c
h
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
u
s
 
3
.
 
C
a
l
o
r
i
c
 
i
n
t
a
k
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
f
t
 
4
.
 
T
o
t
a
l
 
c
a
l
o
r
i
c
 
i
n
t
a
k
e
 
5
.
 
P
s
y
c
h
i
c
a
l
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
.
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
i
n
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
(
i
)
 
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
i
n
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
a
)
 
(
S
 
o
n
l
y
)
 
t
h
a
n
 
i
n
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
,
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
a
m
o
n
g
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
.
 
(
i
i
)
 
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
l
a
r
g
e
r
 
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
e
x
e
r
c
i
s
e
 
i
n
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
c
)
 
(
S
+
E
+
T
)
,
 
d
)
 
(
S
+
E
+
I
)
 
a
n
d
 
e
)
 
(
S
+
E
+
T
+
I
)
 
t
h
a
n
 
i
n
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
.
 
 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
)
:
 
e
.
i
.
n
.
i
.
 
 
 
6
 
J
e
f
f
e
r
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
8
3
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u
n
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y
:
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S
A
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
:
 
B
M
I
 
(
m
e
a
n
)
 
k
g
/
m
²
 
o
f
 
3
1
.
8
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
B
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
a
l
l
y
 
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
i
n
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
 
i
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
(
3
0
 
l
b
s
.
)
 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
1
5
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
b
y
 
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
:
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
v
a
r
i
e
d
 
i
n
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
a
n
d
 
t
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
(
r
e
f
u
n
d
s
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
t
 
o
n
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
o
r
 
m
e
a
n
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
)
 
a
)
 
n
=
 
1
6
,
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
/
 
$
3
0
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
b
)
 
n
=
1
5
,
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
/
 
$
1
5
0
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
c
)
 
n
=
1
4
,
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
/
 
$
3
0
0
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
d
)
 
n
=
1
4
,
 
g
r
o
u
p
/
 
$
3
0
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
e
)
 
n
=
1
4
,
 
g
r
o
u
p
/
 
$
1
5
0
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
f
)
 
n
=
1
4
,
 
g
r
o
u
p
/
 
$
3
0
0
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
3
,
 
1
2
 
a
n
d
 
2
4
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
:
 
 
1
.
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
 
2
.
 
%
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
i
n
g
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
e
d
 
g
o
a
l
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
(
i
)
 
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
e
s
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
p
h
a
s
e
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
,
 
(
i
i
)
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
o
f
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
,
 
(
i
i
i
)
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
i
n
g
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
e
d
 
g
o
a
l
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
l
a
r
g
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
,
 
(
i
v
)
 
s
i
z
e
 
o
f
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
e
x
h
i
b
i
t
e
d
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
3
 
a
n
d
 
1
2
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
 
 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
)
:
 
 
N
o
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
i
s
o
n
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
(
n
o
n
-
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
)
 
,
i
.
e
.
,
 
 
g
e
n
u
i
n
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
e
d
.
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p
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i
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e
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w
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P
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p
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P
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c
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w
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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b
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r
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c
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r
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n
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p
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c
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c
i
s
e
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
s
)
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
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c
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c
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c
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w
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n
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i
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p
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c
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p
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c
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d
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d
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i
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d
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i
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d
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d
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i
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d
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c
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p
e
r
 
w
e
e
k
)
 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
1
1
 
w
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b
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n
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c
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c
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c
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c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
(
i
)
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
i
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
l
o
r
i
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
t
h
a
n
 
i
n
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
g
r
o
u
p
,
 
(
i
i
)
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
t
h
a
n
 
i
n
 
n
o
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
)
:
 
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
b
y
 
s
e
l
f
-
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
w
a
s
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
d
r
o
p
-
o
u
t
s
.
 
 
1
0
 
J
e
f
f
e
r
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
9
3
a
)
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
:
 
U
S
A
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
:
 
B
M
I
 
(
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t
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o
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i
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c
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s
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o
m
b
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i
t
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p
a
y
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s
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i
n
c
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n
t
i
v
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s
y
s
t
e
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a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
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i
n
c
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n
t
i
v
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u
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n
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c
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.
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a
m
o
u
n
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o
f
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y
c
h
e
c
k
 
d
e
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a
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e
l
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e
l
e
c
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e
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m
i
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b
i
w
e
e
k
l
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i
t
h
i
n
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o
r
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m
p
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y
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u
l
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e
l
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e
l
e
c
t
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o
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r
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r
o
u
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s
 
b
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c
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c
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c
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c
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p
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c
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c
t
e
d
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
-
l
o
s
s
 
g
o
a
l
.
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c
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c
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p
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c
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c
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1
 
l
b
 
p
e
r
 
d
a
y
 
f
o
r
 
p
h
a
s
e
 
2
 
(
w
e
e
k
s
 
2
5
 
t
o
 
3
2
)
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
b
y
 
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
 
(
E
q
u
a
l
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
 
s
t
r
a
t
i
f
i
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
g
e
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
x
)
:
 
a
)
 
n
=
2
2
 
c
o
u
r
s
e
 
o
n
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
 
b
)
 
n
=
2
2
 
c
o
u
r
s
e
;
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
;
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
8
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
f
r
a
m
e
d
 
a
s
 
“
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
”
 
c
)
 
n
=
2
2
 
c
o
u
r
s
e
;
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
;
 
f
i
n
a
l
 
8
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
n
o
t
 
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
l
y
 
f
r
a
m
e
d
 
a
s
 
“
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
”
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
3
6
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
m
i
x
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
;
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
(
i
)
 
h
i
g
h
l
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
 
o
n
 
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
;
 
(
i
i
)
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
w
o
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
;
 
(
i
i
i
)
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
i
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
 
1
4
 
K
r
a
m
e
r
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
8
6
)
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
:
 
U
S
A
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
:
 
B
M
I
 
(
m
e
a
n
)
 
k
g
/
m
²
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
,
 
m
e
a
n
 
W
e
i
g
h
t
 
o
f
 
1
8
0
 
l
b
s
,
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
o
f
 
a
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
1
5
-
w
e
e
k
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
-
l
o
s
s
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
(
h
a
d
 
l
o
s
t
 
1
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
b
o
d
y
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
)
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
-
l
o
s
s
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
w
i
t
h
 
w
e
e
k
l
y
 
w
e
i
g
h
-
i
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
u
r
s
e
s
 
p
l
u
s
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
i
n
 
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
t
o
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
s
k
i
l
l
s
 
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
s
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
 
t
o
 
s
o
l
i
d
i
f
y
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
a
l
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
o
n
e
 
y
e
a
r
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
b
y
 
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
 
n
=
8
5
:
a
)
 
n
=
2
9
,
 
r
e
f
u
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
c
o
u
r
s
e
s
 
(
$
 
1
2
0
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
,
 
$
 
1
0
 
 
r
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
p
e
r
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
s
e
s
s
i
o
n
)
 
b
)
 
n
=
2
8
,
 
r
e
f
u
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
m
a
i
n
t
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
a
n
d
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
s
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
(
$
 
1
2
0
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
,
 
$
 
1
0
 
 
r
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
p
e
r
 
s
h
a
r
e
d
 
s
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
)
 
c
)
 
n
=
2
9
,
 
n
o
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
,
 
o
n
l
y
 
$
 
2
0
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
f
o
r
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
.
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
1
 
y
e
a
r
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
:
 
1
.
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
m
i
x
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
p
u
t
 
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
 
(
i
)
 
f
o
r
t
y
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
r
e
g
a
i
n
e
d
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
i
n
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
(
i
i
)
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
r
e
g
a
i
n
 
a
m
o
n
g
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
(
i
i
i
)
 
l
a
r
g
e
r
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
m
i
x
e
d
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
(
i
v
)
 
v
a
r
i
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
r
e
g
a
i
n
 
w
a
s
 
l
a
r
g
e
r
 
i
n
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
n
f
o
u
n
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
-
s
o
l
v
i
n
g
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
s
 
(
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
d
o
e
s
 
n
o
t
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
 
a
n
y
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
)
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b
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A
1
,
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
 
N
r
.
 
S
t
u
d
y
 
(
a
u
t
h
o
r
 
a
n
d
 
y
e
a
r
)
 
S
t
u
d
y
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
 
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
 
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
5
 
M
a
h
o
n
e
y
 
(
1
9
7
4
)
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
:
 
U
S
A
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
:
 
B
M
I
 
(
m
e
a
n
)
 
k
g
/
m
²
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
,
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
2
0
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
v
e
r
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
o
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
(
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
a
w
a
r
d
e
d
 
t
h
e
m
s
e
l
v
e
s
 
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
o
w
n
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
f
o
r
 
a
t
t
a
i
n
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
o
r
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
h
a
b
i
t
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
 
g
o
a
l
s
 
)
 
$
 
3
5
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
a
n
d
 
$
5
 
f
o
r
 
a
b
s
e
n
c
e
s
)
 
a
n
d
 
S
=
 
s
e
l
f
-
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
w
i
t
h
 
w
e
e
k
l
y
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
i
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
p
a
m
p
h
l
e
t
s
 
o
n
 
d
i
a
r
y
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
8
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
b
y
 
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
:
 
 
a
)
 
n
=
1
1
,
 
d
e
l
a
y
e
d
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
b
)
 
n
=
1
3
,
 
S
+
 
w
e
e
k
l
y
 
s
e
l
f
 
r
e
w
a
r
d
 
f
o
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
c
)
 
n
=
1
1
,
 
S
+
 
w
e
e
k
l
y
 
s
e
l
f
-
r
e
w
a
r
d
 
f
o
r
 
h
a
b
i
t
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
 
d
)
 
n
=
1
4
,
 
S
 
o
n
l
y
.
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
1
2
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
:
 
1
.
 
%
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
 
m
a
i
n
t
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
(
i
)
 
i
n
p
u
t
 
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
i
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
 
(
i
i
)
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
n
o
t
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
(
i
i
i
)
 
n
o
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
s
h
o
r
t
e
r
 
p
r
e
-
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
d
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
.
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
o
w
e
r
 
f
a
r
 
b
e
l
o
w
 
c
o
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
s
i
z
e
 
(
n
o
 
c
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
)
 
 
1
6
 
M
a
v
i
s
 
a
n
d
 
S
t
ö
f
f
e
l
m
a
y
r
 
(
1
9
9
4
)
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
:
 
U
S
A
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
:
 
B
M
I
 
(
m
e
a
n
)
 
k
g
/
m
²
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
,
 
M
e
a
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
o
f
 
2
0
6
 
l
b
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
 
W
e
e
k
l
y
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
s
,
 
p
r
o
c
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
h
e
l
p
f
u
l
 
t
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
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c
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p
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i
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h
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r
a
t
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1
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w
e
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r
o
u
p
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b
y
 
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
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o
n
t
i
n
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o
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o
s
i
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i
v
e
 
r
e
i
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r
c
e
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e
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e
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u
n
d
 
p
e
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h
a
r
e
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e
s
s
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o
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b
)
 
n
=
2
0
,
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o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
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c
o
s
t
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i
f
 
t
h
e
 
w
e
e
k
l
y
 
a
i
m
 
i
s
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
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c
)
 
n
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2
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,
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
r
e
i
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
w
i
t
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a
 
l
o
t
t
e
r
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s
y
s
t
e
m
 
(
d
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
$
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a
t
 
t
h
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"
a
c
c
o
u
n
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"
 
f
o
r
 
n
o
n
-
a
t
t
a
i
n
m
e
n
t
)
 
d
)
 
n
=
2
1
,
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
c
o
s
t
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
l
o
t
t
e
r
y
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
(
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
l
o
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
l
o
t
t
e
r
y
 
u
p
o
n
 
e
n
t
i
r
e
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
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e
)
 
n
=
2
0
,
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
i
s
o
n
,
 
t
h
i
s
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
w
a
s
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
a
n
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
-
c
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
t
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
r
e
w
a
r
d
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
 
(
W
i
t
h
d
r
a
w
a
l
 
o
f
 
l
o
t
s
 
i
n
 
c
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
n
o
n
-
a
t
t
a
i
n
m
e
n
t
)
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
n
o
t
 
m
e
n
t
i
o
n
e
d
.
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
:
 
1
.
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
 
2
.
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
 
3
.
 
n
o
.
 
o
f
 
t
i
m
e
s
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
d
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
g
o
a
l
 
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
(
i
)
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
e
s
 
i
n
 
a
l
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
b
u
t
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
,
 
(
i
i
)
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
l
o
w
e
r
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
m
e
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
o
f
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
g
o
a
l
s
 
i
n
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
a
)
,
 
(
i
i
i
)
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
d
r
o
p
o
u
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
i
n
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
d
)
 
 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
)
:
 
 
n
o
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
i
s
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
o
n
-
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
,
 
t
r
u
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
e
d
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u
d
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t
h
o
r
 
a
n
d
 
y
e
a
r
)
 
S
t
u
d
y
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
 
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
 
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
7
 
P
a
u
l
-
E
b
h
o
h
i
m
h
e
n
 
a
n
d
 
A
v
e
n
e
l
l
 
(
2
0
0
8
)
 
 
M
e
t
a
-
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
:
 
U
S
A
 
a
n
d
 
C
a
n
a
d
a
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
:
 
B
M
I
 
(
m
e
a
n
)
 
k
g
/
m
²
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
2
9
.
3
-
 
3
1
.
8
 
 
 
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
1
 
y
e
a
r
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
:
 
1
.
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
(
i
)
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
n
e
e
d
 
t
o
 
a
m
o
u
n
t
 
t
o
 
a
t
 
l
e
a
s
t
 
1
.
2
 
%
 
o
f
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
a
l
 
d
i
s
p
o
s
a
b
l
e
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
t
o
 
i
n
d
u
c
e
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
o
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
,
 
i
f
 
a
t
 
a
l
l
,
 
(
i
i
)
 
n
o
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
,
 
(
i
i
i
)
 
i
n
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
i
n
d
u
c
e
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
e
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
1
8
 
S
a
c
c
o
n
e
 
a
n
d
 
I
s
r
a
e
l
 
(
1
9
7
8
)
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
:
 
U
S
A
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
:
 
B
M
I
 
(
m
e
a
n
)
 
k
g
/
m
²
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
,
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
1
6
%
 
t
o
 
1
0
0
%
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
e
d
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
(
m
e
a
n
 
4
6
%
)
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
o
n
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
(
$
3
5
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
f
u
n
d
s
 
f
o
r
 
(
a
)
 
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
l
y
 
r
e
d
u
c
i
n
g
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
(
b
)
 
c
o
m
p
l
i
a
n
c
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
 
)
 
 
S
u
c
c
e
s
s
:
 
(
a
)
 
l
b
/
w
e
e
k
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
(
a
w
a
r
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
$
1
.
5
 
p
e
r
 
l
b
 
u
p
 
t
o
 
m
a
x
i
m
u
m
 
o
f
 
$
5
.
0
0
 
p
e
r
 
w
e
e
k
)
 
(
b
)
 
c
o
m
p
l
i
a
n
c
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
r
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
0
-
6
3
 
p
o
i
n
t
 
s
c
a
l
e
)
;
 
a
w
a
r
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
u
p
 
t
o
 
$
5
.
0
0
 
p
e
r
 
w
e
e
k
 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
9
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
b
y
 
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
:
 
0
)
 
n
=
5
;
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
a
n
y
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
a
)
 
n
=
6
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
o
n
l
y
-
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
(
c
o
u
r
s
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
l
f
-
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
)
 
b
)
 
n
=
8
,
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
o
n
l
y
-
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
 
(
c
o
u
r
s
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
l
f
-
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
)
 
 
 
c
)
 
n
=
7
,
 
r
e
i
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
r
a
p
i
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
(
c
o
u
r
s
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
f
u
n
d
s
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
r
a
p
i
s
t
)
,
 
,
 
 
d
)
 
n
=
7
,
 
r
e
i
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
r
a
p
i
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
(
c
o
u
r
s
e
s
 
u
n
d
 
r
e
f
u
n
d
s
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
r
a
p
i
s
t
)
 
 
e
)
 
n
=
8
,
 
r
e
i
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
b
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
s
p
o
u
s
e
 
f
o
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
”
 
(
c
o
u
r
s
e
 
u
n
d
 
r
e
f
u
n
d
s
 
t
r
o
u
g
h
 
s
p
o
u
s
e
)
 
 
f
)
 
n
=
7
,
 
r
e
i
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
b
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
s
p
o
u
s
e
 
f
o
r
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
 
(
c
o
u
r
s
e
 
u
n
d
 
r
e
f
u
n
d
s
 
t
r
o
u
g
h
 
s
p
o
u
s
e
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
n
o
t
 
m
e
n
t
i
o
n
e
d
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
:
 
1
.
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
 
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
e
i
t
h
e
r
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
 
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
o
r
 
i
n
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
o
n
l
y
 
f
o
u
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
b
u
t
 
n
o
t
 
f
o
r
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
r
e
f
u
n
d
s
.
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
i
s
 
m
u
c
h
 
s
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
 
i
f
 
r
e
f
u
n
d
 
i
s
 
p
a
i
d
 
b
y
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
o
t
h
e
r
.
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S
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I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
1
9
 
I
s
r
a
e
l
 
a
n
d
 
S
a
c
c
o
n
e
 
(
1
9
7
9
)
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
U
p
 
t
o
 
S
a
c
c
o
n
e
 
a
n
d
 
I
s
r
a
e
l
 
(
1
9
7
8
)
 
R
e
t
u
r
n
 
f
o
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
-
i
n
s
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
 
U
S
D
 
3
5
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
o
f
 
a
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
.
 
N
o
 
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
.
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
3
 
a
n
d
 
1
2
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
 
(
i
)
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
 
d
i
d
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
s
u
l
t
 
i
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
-
l
o
s
s
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
a
t
 
b
o
t
h
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
s
,
 
(
i
i
)
 
m
o
r
e
 
p
r
o
m
i
s
i
n
g
 
l
o
n
g
-
t
e
r
m
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
i
s
 
a
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
r
e
i
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
a
l
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
a
 
f
a
m
i
l
y
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
o
r
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
’
s
 
n
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
 
 
 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
 
v
e
r
y
 
s
m
a
l
l
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
h
i
g
h
 
a
t
t
r
i
t
i
o
n
 
r
a
t
e
 
 
 
2
0
 
V
o
l
p
p
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
2
0
0
8
)
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
:
 
U
S
A
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
:
 
B
M
I
 
(
m
e
a
n
)
 
k
g
/
m
²
 
o
f
 
3
5
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
m
o
n
i
t
o
r
i
n
g
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
w
i
t
h
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
g
o
a
l
 
o
f
 
1
l
b
 
p
e
r
 
w
e
e
k
 
p
l
u
s
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
1
6
 
w
e
e
k
s
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
b
y
 
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
:
 
a
)
 
n
=
1
9
,
 
"
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
"
 
g
r
o
u
p
:
 
s
e
l
f
-
c
h
o
s
e
n
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
$
0
.
0
1
 
a
n
d
 
$
3
 
p
e
r
 
d
a
y
,
 
p
a
y
o
u
t
:
 
2
*
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
o
n
l
y
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
a
i
m
 
w
a
s
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
d
 
 
b
)
 
n
=
1
9
,
 
“
l
o
t
t
e
r
y
”
 
g
r
o
u
p
:
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
o
f
 
$
3
 
p
e
r
 
d
a
y
 
f
o
r
 
r
e
a
c
h
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
d
a
i
l
y
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
-
 
P
a
y
o
u
t
s
 
o
n
l
y
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
a
i
m
 
w
a
s
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
d
.
 
c
)
 
n
=
1
9
,
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
7
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
:
 
1
.
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
 
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
 
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
i
g
h
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
 
(
i
)
 
b
o
t
h
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
 
h
i
g
h
e
r
 
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
 
t
o
 
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
g
o
a
l
 
 
(
i
i
)
 
b
o
t
h
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
l
o
s
t
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
m
o
r
e
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
t
h
a
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
(
i
i
i
)
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
s
 
(
i
v
)
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
n
o
t
 
s
u
s
t
a
i
n
a
b
l
e
 
 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
H
i
g
h
 
d
r
o
p
-
o
u
t
 
r
a
t
e
.
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
n
f
o
u
n
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
e
n
h
a
n
c
e
d
 
a
t
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
e
d
i
c
a
l
 
c
e
n
t
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
d
a
i
l
y
 
c
a
l
l
-
i
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
e
e
d
b
a
c
k
 
(
o
v
e
r
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
)
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T
a
b
l
e
 
A
1
,
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
e
d
 
N
r
.
 
S
t
u
d
y
 
(
a
u
t
h
o
r
 
a
n
d
 
y
e
a
r
)
 
S
t
u
d
y
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
 
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
 
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
R
e
s
u
l
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
2
1
 
W
i
n
g
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
 
(
1
9
8
1
)
 
 
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
:
 
U
S
A
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
:
 
B
M
I
 
(
m
e
a
n
)
 
k
g
/
m
²
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
,
 
M
e
a
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
o
f
 
2
0
1
 
l
b
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
:
 
w
e
e
k
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
l
e
s
s
o
n
s
 
t
o
 
l
e
a
r
n
 
t
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
e
s
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
;
 
$
2
2
5
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
,
 
$
1
5
 
o
f
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
a
s
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
e
d
 
a
t
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
f
 
e
i
g
h
t
 
w
e
e
k
l
y
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
v
e
n
 
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
m
e
e
t
i
n
g
s
 
;
 
w
h
e
r
e
 
r
e
f
u
n
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
t
 
o
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
,
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
g
o
a
l
s
 
e
q
u
a
l
e
d
 
a
 
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
l
o
s
s
 
o
f
 
2
 
l
b
s
/
w
e
e
k
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
b
e
g
i
n
n
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
p
h
a
s
e
 
(
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
/
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
)
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
g
o
a
l
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
e
s
c
h
e
d
u
l
e
d
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
i
f
 
r
e
f
u
n
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
f
o
r
f
e
i
t
e
d
 
t
w
o
 
c
o
n
s
e
c
u
t
i
v
e
 
t
i
m
e
s
.
 
D
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
9
 
m
o
n
t
h
s
 
G
r
o
u
p
s
 
b
y
 
a
s
s
i
g
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
)
 
n
=
1
8
,
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
e
p
a
i
d
 
f
o
r
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
b
)
 
n
=
 
2
0
,
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
e
p
a
i
d
 
f
o
r
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
a
n
c
e
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
d
u
r
i
n
g
 
m
a
i
n
t
e
n
a
n
c
e
 
F
o
l
l
o
w
-
u
p
:
 
7
 
m
o
n
t
h
 
O
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
:
 
1
.
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
 
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
C
o
u
p
l
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
-
 
o
r
i
e
n
t
e
d
 
 
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
:
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
(
i
)
 
S
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
i
n
 
b
o
t
h
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
,
 
n
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
,
 
(
i
i
)
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
m
o
r
e
 
d
r
o
p
 
o
u
t
s
 
w
h
e
n
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
 
l
o
s
s
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
i
n
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
 
L
i
m
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
(
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
)
:
 
n
o
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
i
s
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
o
n
-
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
,
 
t
r
u
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
c
a
n
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
e
d
 
 
1
 
I
f
 
n
o
t
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
d
,
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
t
r
e
a
t
s
 
d
r
o
p
-
o
u
t
s
 
a
s
 
i
f
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
a
s
e
l
i
n
e
 
w
e
i
g
h
t
.
 
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
S
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
s
u
m
m
a
r
i
z
e
d
 
b
y
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
.
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